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RETHINKING MIGRATION RESPONSES IN
A CONTEXT OF RESTRICTION AND
RECESSION:

CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEXICO AND
THE UNITED STATES
FranciscoAlba*

IN

February 2001, President Fox of Mexico and President Bush of the

United States engaged their administrations to find mutually acceptable responses to the lingering migration issue that had often placed
the two countries at odds.' The high-level contacts and discussions, amply interpreted as the first stages of a negotiating process,2 had quite ambitious objectives.3 Expectations of arriving at a far-reaching agreement
were high until the events of September 11, 2001 brought that negotiating
process to an abrupt end. 4
In 2004, the Bush administration opened the debate on migration reform to fix what was considered a "broken" system, while simultaneColegio de M6xico, falba@colmex.mx.
Conference on Challenges and Opportunities in Mexico: Implications for U.S.Mexico Relations Southern Methodist University March 25-26, 2010
1. See Francisco Alba, Del didlogo de Zedillo y Clinton al entendimiento de Fox y
*El

Bush sobre migracidn, in MFxico-ESoADOS UNIDOS-CANADA 1999-2000 109-164
(Bernardo Mabire, ed., 2003); see also generally JoRGEoi 1. DomIuN-z AND RAVAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, THE UNITED STiATiS AND
NERSHIP AND CONFLIcI (2009).

ME XICO: BETWEEN

PART-

2. Some authors question whether the process was a negotiation. The United States
ambassador to Mexico at the time argued it was "a negotiation that was not a
negotiation as such." See generally, JEFFREY DAVIDOW, Ti U.S. AN1) MEXICO:
TH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MEXTiH BEAR ANDIIFe PORCUPINE: TESTIMONY OFw
ico 1998-2002, Chapter 14 (Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004).
3. The agenda was centered on legalizing the status of Mexicans already residing in
the United States without authorization, establishing a guest worker program, enhancing border safety conditions, and on increasing the number of U.S. visas available for Mexicans. The issue of economic cooperation to accelerate the
development of the main regions of origin of migrants was also part of the agenda.
See, e.g., Alba, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Rodolfo Tuirin, Mixico y el debate migratorio en Estados Unidos, FoREIGN AFFAIRS EN ESPAN1L, Oct-Dec. 2009; Julie Watts, Mexico-U.S. Migration

and Labor Unions: Obstacles to Building Cross-Border Solidarity 6-15 (U.C. San
Diego Ctr. for Comp. Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 79, 2003), available at
http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg79.pdf.
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ously, 5 the building up of fences-real and virtual-along the U.S.Mexico border continued quite vigorously. After Congressional attempts
to pass a meaningful migration reform failed, the administration intensified the enforcement of immigration laws, becoming notorious for the
number and the visibility of worksite raids. 6 In late 2007, a deep economic recession settled in the United States, obliterating in practice the
possibility of any meaningful resumption of the debate on comprehensive
7
immigration reform.
President Barack Obama, who took office in January 2009, was expected to tackle immigration reform early in his tenure. 8 But more than a
year into his administration, he has not undertaken any major migration
initiative. 9 Instead, his administration has followed, although by quite
different means, the inherited policies of the past administration. Thus,
in a context of mounting migratory restrictions and profound economic
recession, the prospects for the U.S. Congress passing any immigration
reform in the near future are rather uncertain.
On Mexico's side, the events of September 11 also derailed what was
consolidating as the main Mexican response to the migration issue: to
engage the United States in discussing the idea of managing the migration
phenomenon "bilaterally." The migration negotiations in early 2001 were
a sort of culmination along that path when Mexico made migration issues
a key component of Mexico-U.S. relations. After September 11, Mexico
was left sort of "empty-handed" in terms of migration commitments by
the U~nited States. But after it was clear that a new post-September-il
international context was emerging that would adversely affect the continuity of past migration trends, the harbingers of a new set of responses
began to emerge around 2005, centered on the concept of "shared
responsibility." 10
In December 2006, Felipe Calder6n was sworn in as Mexico's president. From the very beginning of his administration it was made clear
that, in contrast to his predecessor, Calder6n did not intend to prioritize
the migration issue within Mexico's complex relationship with the United
States. Instead, the Calder6n government has opted for a subtler, low5. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, As Immigration Raids Rise, Human Toll Decried, BosTON Gi~o131, Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/O3/
20/as-immigration-raids-rise-human-toll decried!.
6. See id.
7. Kristen McCabe & Doris Meissner, immigration and the United States: Recession
Affects Flows, Prospects for Reform, MIGRATION POL ICY INSTITUTE, http:Ilwww.
migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=766.

8. See, e.g., Job One: First Things First, Mr. President-elect. Some Thoughts on What
Obama's Top PriorityShould Be, WASH. Pos-r, Nov. 9, 2008, at B2.
9. The focus on other foreign issues and the health reform can probably be held accountable for the scant activity on the migration reform front.
10. See, SE-CR~iARfA rni RiLACIONES ExII]-RIORuiS, Mexico FRENTh- AL FENOMENO
MIGRATORIO (2005), http://www.sre.gob.mx/eventos/fenomenomigratorio/docs/
mexicofrentealfenommig.pdf, translated in MINISTRY OF FORFIGN AFFAIRS, MiFXICO AND) THll MIGRATION PHE~NOMENON, http://www.sre.gob.mx/eventos/fenomenoengl.htm.
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key approach on migration matters. It has reiterated that economic development and job creation in Mexico are key factors for breaking Mexico's migration cycle." But the strategy for job creation has rested almost
exclusively on creating favorable conditions to attract private-domestic
and foreign-investment.12
Notwithstanding that the economic recession has adversely affected
U.S. demand for Mexican labor and caused remittances to Mexico to fall
by more than fifteen percent in 2009 (compared with 2008), the administration's positions have not changed.1 3 For the Calder6n government,
regaining the rule of law and fighting drug trafficking and organized
crime became a priority. 14
The argument of this article is that Mexico, confronted with a rising
restrictionist climate regarding immigration and a recession related
debilitating demand for Mexican labor, needs to intensify its efforts in
search of responses to deal with the migration issue responsive to the new
times.15 To develop the argument, the article is divided into the following
three sections: first, a brief review of current Mexican migration trends;
second, a succinct account of "past responses" is meant to serve as a
background for the challenges Mexico is now facing to develop "new responses"; third, a discussion of main opportunities and challenges to manage migration in the context of restriction and recession concludes the
article.

See, e.g., Claudia Herrera and David Carrizales, La migraci6n,fen6meno inevitable
y econ6micamente conveniente: Calder6n, LA JORNADA, Sept. 22, 2007; Olga Rodriguez, Calderon Visits U.S.-Mexico Border, WASH. Pos'r, Dec. 20, 2006, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/20/AR2006122001454.
html.
12. See id. At the start of the Calderon administration, The First Job Program was
launched. The intent of this program was to facilitate the creation of jobs and the
hiring of workers in the formal sectors. See President Felipe Calder6n, Remarks at
the Signing Ceremony for the First Job Program (Jan. 15, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/discursos/?contenido=28619). But as
of 2009, the program has not proved significant in creating additional formal employment. See, e.g., Susana Gonzalez, Fallido, el PrincipalPrograma de Calder6n
Para Generar Empleos, La Journada, Mar. 14, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.
jornada.unam.mx/2009/03/14/index.php?section=economia&article=01 6nl eco.
13. See, BBVA, Observatorio migraci6n Mixico, Jan. 28, 2010, available at http://
serviciodeestudios.bbva.com/KETD/fbin/mult/1 00128_ObsMigraMexico 8jtcm
346-213929.pdf?ts=1282010; Remittances to Mexico Down Nearly 16 Pct in 2009,
LA PRENSA, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.laprensasa.com/2.0/3/309/556054/Americain-English/Remittances-to-Mexico-down-nearly-i 6-pct-in-2009.html.
14. Ironically, the resulting violence and insecurity have pushed many Mexicans to
migrate North in search of a secure and better place to live. See, e.g., Paola Reyes,
Fleeing Violence, Immigrants and Restaurants Move from Tijuana, Mexico to San
11.

Diego, LAIN AM. NEws DISPATCI, Jan. 20, 2010, http://latindispatch.com/2010/01/

20/fleeing-violence-immigrants-and-restaurants-move-from-tijuana-mexico-to-sandiego.
15. Towards the end of 2006, near the change of government, I ventured on some
initial ideas in this direction. See Francisco Alba, La Reconsideraci6n de la Politica
Migratoria Internacional,in Mixico: Los RETOS ANTEiLi_ FUTUIo 57-74 (2007).
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I.

INFLEXION OF MEXICAN MIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES

The history of Mexican migration to the United States is one of
changes and continuities. But recent developments point toward a possible great discontinuity in Mexico-U.S. migration trends. Certainly, since
1942 there have been ups and downs regarding migration flows and
stocks. But since the 1970s trends have steadily risen, until recently,
when the flows stabilized and may have even reversed course. Those rising trends, in terms of flows and stocks, are documented first to compare
them with more recent developments.
The approximate number of Mexicans settling permanently in the
United States-with or without U.S. authorization-increased steadily
since the 1970s; it grew from less than a quarter of a million per year in
the 1980s to well above the 300,000 mark in the 1990s, and approached
the half-million mark in the early 2000s (see Table 1).16
Table 1
Period

L(Average

2000-2005
Sources:
1970-1990:
1990-2000:
2000-2005:

Mexican Immigrants
Annual Thousands)

400-500

Binational Study on Migration Between Mexico and the United States.
Commission on immigration Reform and Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
1997.
Estimated figure.
Lower Limit: Rodolfo Corona y Rodolfo Tuiran, Magnitud de la emigracion de mexicanos a Estados Unidos despues del afio 2000, PAPEL17S DE POBLACION, July -Sept

2008, at 9- 38.
Upper Limit: La situacion demografica en Mexico, 2006. Consejo Nacional de
Poblacion, 2006.

Over the same years, accordingly, the size of the Mexican-born population in the U.S. quickly increased. The Mexican immigrant population
nearly doubled from 2.2 million in 1980 to 4.3 million in 1990, and again
almost doubled to 9.2 million in 2000. As of 2008, the Mexican immigrant
17
population jumped to 11.4 million.
16. Some demographers consider the half-million figure to be too high, because it
probably includes some temporary migrants, estimating as more accurate a figure
in the range of 400,000 per year. See Rodolfo Corona & Rodolfo Tuiran, Magnitud
de Ia Emigracidn de Mexicanos a Estados Unidos despuds del Anio 2000, PA1CELs
DF POBLAC10N, July-Sept. 2008, at 9, 17.
17. Aaron Terrazas, Mexican Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTrIUTE, Feb. 2010, http://www.migrationinfornmatinorg/IUSFocuis/display cfmID
=767. Of course, the Mexican-origin population in the United States (US-born
and Mexico-born) has grown as well. By 2008, it surpassed thirty million, with

more than eighteen million U.S. citizens of Mexican origin.
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Over time, Mexican migration also changed its character. A salient
change charged with quite diverse implications has to do with the fact
that displacements gradually became more permanent, rather than cyclical and temporary. 18 Moreover, over the years, the distinction between
circular and permanent migration has become blurred. At the same time,
the unauthorized Mexican population has also been on the increase, after
a relative lull associated with the U.S. legalization programs of the late
1980s. Since the year 2000, more than half of the Mexican immigrant
population resides in the United States illegally.
Table 2
Mexico-born Population in the U.S. (millions)

Year

"H

Sources:
1970; 1980; 1990:
2000; 2006:

Binational Study on Migration Between Mexico and the United States.

Commission on immigration Reform and Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, 1997.
Jeffrey Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Mexican Immigrants. How many came? How
many leave?, Pew Hispanic Center, July 2009.

Over the years, other important changes have also taken place. The
days of predominantly rural and "campesino" migrants are gone. Recent
indicators suggest that the characteristics of migrants are becoming as diverse as the characteristics of the Mexican population at large, in terms of
origin, educational, and occupational levels, and migration has become a
nationwide phenomenon. 19 Although, most migrants belong to the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, there are a greater numbers of professionals and skilled Mexicans among the migrants .2 0

18. Numerous scholars have noted that this change could be related, among other factors, to increased U.S. border enforcement, which made it more difficult and costly
(in terms of smuggler fees, etc.) for Mexicans to cross back and forth.
19. Between 1995 and 2000, only a few dozen municipalities failed to register some
type of migratory activity.
20. As of 2007, there were about 552,000 Mexican immigrants with a bachelor's degree
or higher in the United States-equivalent to nearly seven percent of all Mexican
professionals. See generally ELENA Zr NIA & MIGUEFL MOL INA, DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS IN

MExicO:

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SKILLED MIGRATION

10

(2008).
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Table 3
Apprehensions of Mexicans (thousands)

Year

Source:
2005 -2008: Nancy Rytina & John Simanski, Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol 2005 2008, DHS, Jan. 2009.
Muzaffar Chishti & Clarie Bergeron, Increasing Evidence That Recession Has
2009:
Caused Number of UnauthorizedImmigrants in US to Drop, Migration Policy Institute, Mar. 2010.
Figure.
*Preliminary

Compared with previous, cyclical patterns, Mexican migration trends
have changed significantly in the last few years, particularly since 2007.
U.S. data on Mexican migration flows and Mexican population stocks, as
well as Mexican data on flows, indicate that an important inflexion point
is currently taking place. Arrests of Mexican immigrants in the United
States declined roughly from 1 million in 2006 to a little more than halfmillion 2009 (see Table 3).21 At the same time, between 2007 and 2009,
Mexican born population in the U.S. "stabilized" around the 11.5 million
mark. Apparently, this stabilization is largely a result of a drop in nonauthorized immigration. Recent estimates suggest that the stock of unauthorized Mexican population in the United States might not only be leveling off, but actually declining, as shown in Table 4, from a peak of roughly
7 million, in 2007 and 2008, to 6.7 million in 2009.
Table 4
Mexican Unauthorized Population (millions)

Year
200(0,
200j7

2009

T7.0
6.7

Source:
Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina & Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Residing in the United States: January 2009, DHS, Jan., 2010.

Although the number migrants leaving and reentering Mexico do not
indicate that there has been a "massive return" of Mexicans from abroad,
fewer Mexicans have left the country since the recession began. Mexican
data show that 33.5% fewer Mexicans left Mexico during the second
21. Since the 1990s, the apprehensions figures had been in the range of 1 million to 1.7
million.
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quarter of 2009 than in the same quarter of 2008 and 61.0% fewer than in
the same period of 2006 (see Table 5).
Table 5
Exits and Returns (of Mexicans) 2006 -2009 (2nd Quarter Annually)

86089

200914411

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica y Geografia, Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacioin y Empleo, 2006 to 2009.

The inflexion of migration trends could have far reaching implications.
Remittances can be a good indicator of things to come. Remittances, like
migration, increased in volume and importance in the recent past. The
pace of increase was frantic: from $6.6 billion in 2000 to $25.6 billion in
2006.22

But remittances barely grew in 2007, they declined slightly

(3.6%) in 2008, and then quite steeply in 2009 falling 15.7% to $21.2
billion (see Table 6). The consequences of this trend on the socioeconomic conditions of migrant families and communities remain to be seen
and explored.
Looking into the future of migration, a key issue revolves around the
role and balance between economic and political forces in shaping migration flows and policy. Future flows will depend on how quickly U.S. employers resume hiring and how effective U.S. enforcement proves to be.
But the uncertainty is particularly great in the present circumstances regarding future U.S. demand for immigrant labor. At the same time, the
prospects of Mexico sustaining a path of high economic growth are not
encouraging, while the number of working-age people in Mexico will con-

tinue to expand rapidly into the

2010S. 2 3

22. The increase was probably due, although just in part, to more accurate accounting.
23. But because fertility rates began dropping rapidly in the 1970s, the growth in the
number of working-age people thereafter will also rapidly diminish. See MEXICO:
A COUJNTRY STUDY 79 (Tim L. Merrill & Ramon Mir6, eds. 1997), available at
http:/Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mxtoc.html.
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Table 6
Remittances
2000- 2009
Volume
(millions)

Year

2002
2003
anod
CH
2004 N

218

~xcSstm 15040ic
eInomc~
E

soure: peance

NDCNIUIISO

tio thiste desonses,~

~

Rate of change I(%)

1.
3.2
M XCNREPNE

(Se).wtemao
thonoscio

ones . 24
For a period of approximately twenty years, after the Bracero programs ended in 1965, a tacit understanding evolved between Mexico and
the United States that was characterized by a low degree of governmental
intervention. In that period, Mexico followed "a policy of not having a
policy."12 5 But the passage of the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control
Act ("IRCA") in 1986, in an attempt to place major limits on undocumented Mexican immigration' 26 pushed the Mexican government to adjust its positions and attitudes as a result of the new U.S. policy. The
previous Mexican attitude of "taking some distance" from migration
management, although functional, was no longer tenable. But Mexico
was not prepared to actively respond to the challenges posed by that uni24. This section relies mainly on Francisco Alba, Change and Continuity in Government Responses to Mexican Migration, in POPULATION, CITY AND ENVIRONMLNT
IN CONTEMPORARY M~xico 259-282 (2006).
25. Manuel Garcia y Griego, Hacia una Nueva Visidn del Problema de los Indocumentados en Estados Unidos, in, MANUEL GARCIA Y GRIEGO AND MONICA
VERLA CAMPOS, Mixico Y ESIUADOS UNIDOs FRENTh A LA MIORACION DEL OS
INDOCUMENTADOS 123 (1988).

26. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100l Stat. 3359
(1986). U.S. policies toward irregular immigration have not necessarily been designed to exclusively influence Mexican flows, but since Mexican workers are the
majority of the "undocumented," they are the most directly affected.
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lateral, restrictive action on the U.S. side to deal with a phenomenon that
had long interlocked important economic industries and significant sectors of the labor markets in both countries. Nevertheless, some new responses rapidly emerged. For example, there were attempts to seek a
bilateral approach to deal with migratory issues, and another response
was to reinforce the policy to defend migrants' rights. 2 7
In the 1990s, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
marked a watershed in economic policy and foreign relations between the
three countries in North America. 2 8 But NAFTA was also regarded as a
major attempt to modify Mexican migratory flows by both the United
States and Mexico.29 Expecting that the free movement of goods and
capital would lead to sizable investments in Mexico, it was hoped that
NAFTA would lead to more jobs and higher wages in Mexico, which
would reduce in turn the migratory pressures. Succinctly, migration
would be replaced by trade. Additionally, from a Mexican perspective,
NAFTA offered the country solid conceptual scaffolding for lending credibility to a position that it opposed the emigration of its citizens. 3 0
Nevertheless, in the analytical framework of NAFTA, insufficient attention was paid to the issue of economic convergence among the participating countries to reduce migratory pressures within the North
American region. Thus, contrary to expectations, neither the United
States nor Mexico truly believed that trade liberalization would have the
desired effect on migration. As a result, both resorted to their earlier
positions.
The United States energetically returned to its policy of controlling the
entrance of undocumented workers. The period between 1993 and 1994
saw the initial steps (with a series of Operations) of the policy known as
"prevention through dissuasion," by erecting physical barriers along the
border with Mexico. In 1996, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)-a highly "dissuasive" law-en-

27. See generally Remedios G6mez Arnau, Mixico Y LA PRoTECCION DE sus NACIONALIS EN ESTAoos UNIcos (1990).

28. Francisco Alba, El Tratado de Libre Comercio, la migraci6n y las politicas
migratorias,in DiEZ AlOS D.L TLCAN EN MIIXICO. UNA PERSPEUFIVE ANALfIT-

ICA 215-42 (E. Cdsares and H. Sobarzo, eds., 2004); M. Ayhan Kose, Guy M. Meredith & Christopher M. Towe, How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy?
Review and Evidence, Working Paper No. WP/04/59, 2004, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0459.pdf.
29. The NAFTA proposal was product of the "international consensus" regarding the
assumed linkages between economic development, free trade and international migration. See generally DORIS MEISSNER, TRILATERAL COMM'N, INTrERNATIONAL
MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN A Nuw ERA: PoIcY PERSPECrIiVIS & PRIORIIES
FOR EUROPE, JAPAN, NORTHI AMEiRICA & TIE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIry: A
REPORT TO TIE TRILATERAL COMMISSION (1993).

30. Francisco Alba, The Mexican economy and Mexico-U.S. migration: a macro perspective, in MEXICO-U.S.

MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

33-59 (Agustin E. Latapi &

Susan F. Martin eds., 2008) ("We want to export goods, not people" was an expression frequently used in those years).
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tered into force. 31
Mexico, on its part, reinforced its actions to provide its migrants with
due protection, mostly by expanding its consular protection in the United
States, and by advancing or reinforcing existing bilateral liaison mechanisms along the border. Additionally, the Mexican government under
former President Zedillo implemented a strategy to establish a migratory
dialog with the United States, primarily designed to counter the miseries
suffered by the migrants in their journey under increasingly adverse circumstances. This dialog sought to ensure for the migrants a safe departure with no discrimination and to have their rights respected once they
joined the U.S. work force and society. 32 The legal changes in 1996 leading to "the unrenounceability of Mexican nationality" also had the purpose of "freeing" Mexicans to become citizens of the countries where
they were already residing (overwhelmingly in the United States) to enjoy a legal status that would enable them to defend their rights more
effectively. 33
But the emergence of the "spirit of the NAFTA" also influenced Mexican positions-both societal and governmental-in a different direction,
by providing opportunities to "rationalize" the migration phenomenon.
Thus, in the year 2000, the newly elected president of Mexico, Vicente
Fox, declared himself in favor of an "open border" policy between the
three signatory countries of NAFFA. One of the aims behind this position was to reach an agreement that would liberalize the flow of Mexican
workers, particularly towards the United States. 34 In February 2001, in
Guanajuato, Presidents Fox and Bush agreed to initiate a negotiating process designed to establish a new migratory relationship that would conclude with an orderly system of migratory flows between Mexico and the
United States. 35
This political decision potentially filled a major gap in bilateral relations; it implied the "normalization" of one of the bonds that had profoundly linked the two countries for a long time. The search for rules to
ensure an orderly and predictable management of the migratory phenomenon placed it on a par with trade, investment and financial links. The
joint attempt to channel migratory flows into a legal framework was ex31. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1986).
32. See Gustavo Mohar & Maria-Elena Aicaraz, U.S. Border Controls: A Mexican
Perspective, in Ti-iiL WALLi AROUNDTri- WESTr139-150 (Peter Andreas & Timothy
Snyder eds. 2000).
33. See generally Sidney Weintraub, On the Unrenounceabilityof Mexican Nationality,
in Tiuv BINATIIONAL STUDY ON MIG~RATIION Bi~rirWE-N MEXICO AND) T11i7 UNITD
STATEvS, vol. 3 (1998), available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/binpap-v.html;
see also Alba, supra note 1.
34. Fox's government directly and openly embraced the aim of ensuring the entry of
Mexicans into U.S. labor markets, also due to its interpretation that attributed
Mexican emigration to the limitations and failures of previous governments.
35. Toward a Partnershipfor Prosperity: The Guanajuato Proposal, Joint Communiqud, Feb. 16, 2001, http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/en/search/?contenido=548&
pagina=2&palabras~inagural +address.
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tremely ambitious. For the first time, almost forty years after the conclusion of the Bracero programs, Mexico and the United States were
prepared to seek agreements, through negotiations, on the management
of the migratory phenomenon. But the events of September 11, 2001,
36
aborted any progress that had been achieved to that point.
Until the terrorist attacks against the United States, it could be said
that past Mexican responses exhibited a mixed record; some of these responses can be (and have been) considered successful while others disappointing, but overall past Mexican responses were functional and served
Mexico's main migration interests relatively well; namely, ensuring a relatively safe departure of sizeable numbers of its workers, and avoiding the
worst of the conditions regarding the smuggling and trafficking of its migrants. As for the bilateral migration contacts in progress in 2001, managing to engage the United States at the negotiation table constituted a
"'major triumph" for the Mexican positions. 3 7
Post-September 11 developments could change that appreciation. National security, the aniti-terrorist struggle and border control-the new
U.S. priorities-pose new challenges to both countries in their search for
politically acceptable solutions to manage their migration flows. Since
then, Mexico finds itself at a difficult crossroads, 38 confronted by a scenario where the "economic logic of market forces"-more favorable to migration in receiving countries-has been losing room to other logics, like
"the cultural identity logic" or "the national security logic"-less
favorable to migration. 3 9 In this new context, U.S. domestic interests
seem to be prevailing over foreign and strategic interests regarding the
proximity of Mexico.
Prior to these adverse conditions that resulted rather unexpectedly, the
encouraging and optimistic scenario existed between Mexico and the U.S.
that, during the first months of 2001, mutually acceptable agreements to
would possibly manage their migration flows. This inflexion of attitudes
has made it all the more difficult for Mexico to devise new and appropriate responses to overcome the novel and serious dilemmas confronted by
its migration flows.
But at the end of the Fox administration in 2005, there was an unprecedented effort to debate appropriate migration responses to the new conditions. Collectively, public officials, members of the academia and
migration advocates set forth important guiding principles, recommendations, and commitments to update Mexico's migration policy on topics
36. Arriving at any

agreement was still a long way ahead. The U.S. Congress was

barely involved in the various points to the agenda discussed by the executive

branches.
37. An additional domestic positive implication of the negotiating process was that
Mexico's positions had to be expressed in an open, specific and precise manner.
See Alba, supra note 1.
38. See Francisco Alba, Mexico: A Crucial Crossroads, Migration Information Source,
Feb. 2010, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=772.
39. See Rafael FernAndez de Castro, Safety and Migration: a New Paradigm, Foreign
Affairs (Mex.), Oct.-Dec. 2006, at 2-9.
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such as undocumented migration, border and regional security, human
40
smuggling and trafficking, and international cooperation.
A key component of the new responses was the concept of "shared
responsibility,"14 ' indicating Mexico's willingness to do its part regarding
migration management . 42 Among other propositions, it was suggested
that Mexico should take explicit responsibility for improving economic
and social opportunities in the country to retain its population, that Mexico should encourage and ease the return and reincorporation of Mexicans into their home communities, and that Mexico should also make a
better use of remittances and of the enhanced relations with Mexican
communities abroad to advance the development of the country, particularly of the localities of origin of the migrants. But the Calder6n administration has pursued a less direct, more subtle and low-visibility

orientation . 3

111.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Recent migration trends offer new challenges and, of course, also new
opportunities for both Mexico and the United States. The challenges are
not minor ones, as demonstrated by the struggles to find appropriate responses to Mexico-U.S. migration. On Mexico's side, the approaches of
the "principled document" produced in 2005 and the "low-key approach"
of the Calder6n administration are different. This difference suggests, in
my opinion, that the country has not yet found a new "consensual response" to deal with the migration issue in the post-September-li context. On the U.S. side, it has not been possible "to fix its migration
44
system" (to use the amply circulated and accepted expression).
40. See generally Mexico & the Migration Phenomenon, Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2005, http://www.sre.gob.mx/eventos/fenomenoengl.htm. The document
summarizes those deliberations. In 2006, both houses of the Mexican Congress
unanimously endorsed (through a resolution) this document.
41. The concept of shared responsibility had been also central in a previous attempt to
promote a "great bargain" on the migration issue between the two countries. See
The U.S.-Mexico Migration Panel, Mexico-U.S. Migration: A Shared Responsibility, Washingtun, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Instituto
Tecnol6gico Aut6nomo de Mexico, 2001, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=623&prog=zgp.
42. See id. One of the premises of the 2005 Mexico and the Migration Phenomenon
document was that the United States would do its part, in accordance with the
long-held Mexican view that the management of Mexican migration flows should
be bilateral. As a matter of fact, the document was published in major U.S. newspapers in 2006 to influence legislative discussions on various immigration reform
bills introduced in the U.S. Congress. But the move did not have the intended
effect on any specific piece of immigration initiatives, and none were passed by
Congress.
43. At the same time, the Calder6n government has made visible attempts to professionalize migration personnel and to modernize migration facilities to better manage transit migration.
44. The debate on immigration reform in the United States has not reached any solution. Although, de facto, a "restrictive response" has been taking shape and hold
since September 11.
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The emerging era of increasing restrictions certainly creates mounting
difficulties to the continuation of the "secular" Mexican immigration patterns (as we know them). These difficulties could be compounded by the
adverse consequences of a deep economic recession on the demand of
Mexican labor, at least in the short to medium term. Confronted with
restrictive and uncertain migration scenarios, Mexico faces multiple challenges and very difficult decisions ahead.
In my view, two orientations should guide future Mexican responses to
migration. One orientation should be geared to try to deactivate the migration phenomenon altogether. The other should focus on more actively
supporting Mexican migrants and would-be migrants. These orientations
may look contradictory, but they are not, because one viewpoint is the
attitudes versus the migration phenomenon, and another the attitudes
versus the migrants themselves.
Regarding attitudes versus the migration phenomenon, there should be
a political decision, at the highest level, to improve domestic and economic social opportunities and working conditions to encourage people
to stay in Mexico. The country also has to look at its development policies through "the migration lens" with the purpose of deactivating mass
emigration. 4 5 The Mexican government has to factor in "migration deactivation purposes" on its economic and social public policies .46 The country needs, once and for all, to accelerate its pace of economic
development and reduce its regional economic and social gaps .47 But
even if a more dynamic economic growth pattern is found, Mexico may
need to seriously consider the desirability and convenience of implementing significant employment programs (of the type of "active labor or employment policies") closely tied to productive activities, like
infrastructure creation.

45. 1 use this expression with a different meaning from the one "more generally assumed," which refers mostly to the developmental implications of remittances, and
of the "circulation" of the highly skilled migrants and temporary workers. My
meaning puts the emphasis on looking at the development policies with a view to
"retain the population," without exclusion of the previous meaning.
46. 1 have labeled this attitude the "migratization of the development policies." Francisco Alba, Migraci6n M~xico-Estados Unidos, in Foro Nacional. Las politicas de
poblacidn en MWxico 20 (2009), http://www.conapo.gob.mx/publicaciones/foronacional/mesa1 .pdf; see also, Francisco Alba, Migraci6n internacional y politicas
ptiblicas, in El estado de la poblaci6n. Las politicas piiblicas ante los retos de la
migraci6n mexicana a Estados Unidos 23-45 (Paula Leite & Silvia Giorguli eds.
2009), http://www.conapo.gob.mxlpublicaciones/migracion/politicaspublicas/1l.pdf.
47. On Mexico's economic record and migration, see Francisco Alba, The Mexican
Economy and Mexico-U.S. Migration: A Macro Perspective, in Mexico-U.S. Migration Management 33-60 (Agustin Escobar & Susan Martin eds., 2008). But
some developments toward international convergence are also required. Thius, if
migration is not internationally acceptable, it is also essential to devise long term
international (regional) economic and social policies that could deactivate migration pressures. In my view of the international convergence issue, the passage of
Mexico's demographic wave through the working ages will not by itself deactivate
emigration pressures.
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Regarding attitudes versus the migrants, I would venture that Mexico
has multiple responsibilities, some of them new, to make migration a secure, orderly, and successful process. On the one hand, every effort has
to be made to support those migrants in an irregular situation in another
country who want to regularize it, among other actions, by "using," and
by "facilitating" migrants to use all available legal and other U.S. dispositions. On the other, there is need for a more active involvement by Mexico in the "preparation" of those wishing to emigrate, 481 among other
possible initiatives, by allowing, regulating, and supervising "manpower
enterprises," which could train and help place Mexican workers abroad.
The inflexion of migration trends also offers opportunities for the
United States to find political accommodation to the economic and social
49
forces driving migration and to the geostrategic realities of vicinity.
Certainly, the moment is not the most auspicious one for great bargains
and ambitious visions, but given the increasingly interlocked economic,
social and political environments on the two sides of the border, there
should be at least some pragmatic and accommodating migration responses-be it in the form of some kind of "earned regularization," or be
50
it under some type of temporary migration programns.
A fair amount of rethinking will be needed to address the many inconsistencies developed by the main migration responses and policies pursued by both countries (and to redress some of them). Both countries
have to raise themselves to the challenge of constructively managing
some unavoidable migration processes in the context of the enduring nature of the economic, social, and political forces at work, even while looking at migration through the security lens. In more than one way, the
current dilemmas facing Mexico and the United States with regard to migration are the same old ones: the opening of avenues for a safe and
orderly movement of Mexicans into the United States-whether temporarily or permanently-by the two countries; and the forceful and cooperative engagement of the two countries to achieve a "real convergence of
opportunities" in both sides of the border in order to greatly diminish
unwanted migratory pressures.

48. his is accomplished by raising educational levels among the general population,
and by training those who have foreign labor contracts.
49. There is a long-shared history of mutually beneficial U.S.-Mexico relations.
50. Arguing in favor of a thoughtful revision of some of the U.S. current policies is the
realization that relying solely on tightened immigration enforcement is unlikely to
change the economic and social realities that build migration pressures.

